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Abstract 
Drawing upon an empirical analysis of the design and construction of a food processing facility, a theoretical 
understanding of the impact of design decision-making on the occupational health and safety (OHS) of construction 
workers is developed. It is argued that current policy and legislative approaches to Construction Hazard Prevention 
through Design (CHPtD) are inherently limited because they do not adequately reflect the socio-material complexity of 
decision-making in construction design. Specifically, the simplistic attribution of responsibility to a single socio-
technical actor, ‘the designer’, does not reflect the multiple and disparate influences that impact upon OHS outcomes. 
Nor do existing CHPtD policy frameworks, management processes and tools, recognise the manner in which the 
interactions and associations between relevant project stakeholders and various non-human artefacts shape (and are also 
influenced by) the evolution of design decisions. Drawing on actor-network theory (ANT) and using embedded units 
within a case study approach, the interactions between human actors and non-human artefacts is explored in relation to 
the design of four components of the food processing facility. The way in which design decisions unfolded and shaped 
OHS experiences during the construction stage of the project is revealed. The research highlights limitations inherent in 
current approaches to the management of CHPtD and the need to develop a more robust theoretically-based approach to 
integrating OHS considerations into construction design practice. 
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Introduction 
 
Aim 
The aim of this paper is to examine the interactions between relevant project stakeholders and 
material objects or technologies that shape design decision-making in the construction industry, as 
emergent decisions about design can affect the occupational health and safety (OHS) of 
construction workers.  
 
In recent years there has been a widespread acceptance of the notion that construction design 
professionals should bear some responsibility for the OHS of construction workers, a concept 
sometimes referred to as Construction Hazard Prevention through Design (CHPtD) (Gambatese and 
Hinze, 1997; Gambatese et al. 2005). The literature on CHPtD has focused upon providing 
evidence of the link between design and OHS outcomes and identifying tools and technologies that 
support CHPtD. However, researchers suggest current CHPtD policy fails to reflect the 
heterogeneity of design work in the construction industry (Lingard et. al., 2007) and identify a 
‘disconnect’ between the CHPtD policy position and industry practice (Weinstein et al, 2005). 
 
The research utilised an actor-network theory (ANT) approach to reveal the way in which varied 
professional contributors to design interact with material technologies and artefacts to create 
uncertain outcomes and effects. By revealing the emergent connections between social and 
technical determinants of design decision-making (and OHS) the research sought to explain the gap 
that exists between theoretical propositions about the allocation of professional responsibility for 
CHPtD and ‘on the ground’ design practice within projects. 
 
Specifically, the research sought: 
(1) to describe and analyse how design OHS outcomes are actively influenced and shaped 
by the interactions between multiple project stakeholders and non-human technological 
and material artefacts;  
(2) to critically consider the implications of these interactions for industry policy and the 
management of CHPtD; and 
(3) To commence the development of a new theoretical understanding of the challenges 
inherent in implementing the CHPtD concept. 
 
We first provide a critical review of the CHPtD literature and a discussion of the inherent 
complexity of construction design work. We then explore the implications of this complexity for the 
practical implementation of CHPtD before providing a general introduction to Actor Network 
Theory (ANT). We describe our research methods before presenting four vignettes, describing the 
way in which design decisions unfolded at a case study construction project. Lastly, the results are 
discussed and the implications for CHPtD policy and research are considered.  
 
Construction Hazard Prevention through Design (CHPtD) 
CHPtD is defined as 'the consideration of construction site safety in the design of a project'. It 
includes 'modifications to the permanent features of the construction project in such a way that 
construction site safety is considered; attention during the preparation of plans and specifications 
for construction in such a way that construction site safety is considered; the utilization of specific 
design for construction safety suggestions; and the communication of risks regarding the design in 
relation to the site and the work to be performed' (Behm, 2005, p. 590). CHPtD has been 
incorporated into OHS legislation in several industrialised countries. In Australia, a number of 
states and territories have incorporated CHPtD requirements into their principal OHS Acts, 
although requirements are not nationally consistent (Cooke et al. 2009). Notwithstanding this, a 
current national harmonization effort could see the adoption of the Safe Work Act 2009 (Model Safe 
Work Provisions)' in all Australian jurisdictions in 2012. This 'Model Act' contains clear and 
explicit CHPtD responsibilities. 
 
Previous CHPtD literature 
Much of the CHPtD research has focused on substantiating a link between the design of a 
building/structure and the OHS of construction workers (see, for example, Gibb et al. 2004; Behm 
2005; Gambatese et al. 2008; Driscoll; 2005; Smallwood 1996). Although this empirical research 
suggests that the permanent design of a building/structure can impact upon construction workers’ 
OHS, it remains difficult to unequivocally determine the strength or importance of causal 
relationships. Critics of the CHPtD concept identify a failure distinguish between the different 
'design' activities involved in the building industry, confusing design of the building/structure for its 
intended end use with design of the site layout, the process of construction and/or items of 
plant/equipment being used or installed (AIA, 2008). 
 
Other researchers have documented specific design solutions that eliminate an on-site OHS hazard 
or reduce OHS risk during construction (see, for example, Gibb et al. 2007; Wright et al., 2003). 
Some of the CHPtD solutions identified in this literature relate to the design of the construction 
process, rather than the permanent building/structure. Off-site manufacture of building components 
has been proposed as a useful CHPtD strategy (Toole and Gambatese, 2008). Given this assertion, a 
robust comparative analysis of the OHS performance of different building technologies is warranted 
to measure and compare the 'whole of life' OHS performance of off-site solutions relative to 
traditional construction processes. 
 
Researchers have also identified tools that could aid the implementation of CHPtD within 
organizations. Examples include: (i) the development and use of knowledge-based decision support 
tools to provide designers with 'expert' OHS knowledge when reviewing their designs (Davison, 
2003; Cooke et al., 2008); (ii) the use of visualisation tools to identify OHS hazards associated with 
the design of building components and the process of construction (Hadikusumo and Rowlinson, 
2004); and (iii) the use of multi-dimensional Building Information Modelling (BIM) tools, to 
incorporate OHS considerations into construction design and planning (Toole and Gambatese 2008; 
Sulankivi et al. 2010; Kamardeen, 2010).  
 
Thus far the adoption of these tools by industry has been limited. The knowledge-based tools 
described by Davison and Cooke et al. did not progress beyond the prototype stages of 
development, while the implementation of a building model capable of being used throughout the 
design, construction and operation stages of a building’s life cycle has mainly been applied on trial 
projects, often driven by large public sector clients (Howard and Björk, 2008). Lee and Sexton 
(2007) identify attitudinal barriers to the adoption of BIM, including perceptions that the technology 
is too ‘embryonic,’ requires too much investment and is too far removed from existing 
organizational and business processes (Lee and Sexton, 2007). The limited application of 
information communication technology (ICT) tools raises questions about their level of practical 
usefulness to support CHPtD in the context of construction design work. 
 
Harty (2008) argues that it is necessary to understand the context in which innovations are 
introduced in detail in order to appreciate why some innovations are adopted while others are not. 
Researchers have tended to develop prototype CHPtD tools and advocate their use, without 
attempting to evaluate how (indeed if) these tools 'fit' within professional design practice in the 
construction industry. It is important that the development of CHPtD tools is informed by a robust 
understanding of design practice within the construction industry. 
 
Complexity and construction design 
Baccarini (1996) defines complexity as 'consisting of many varied inter-related parts, 
operationalised in terms of high levels of differentiation and interdependency' (p.202). Project 
complexity can be organizational (i.e., a significant division of tasks, multiple organizational units 
and/or hierarchical levels, multiple specialisations and many interdependencies between 
organizational elements) or technological (i.e., multiple diverse inputs, outputs, tasks or specialities 
and many interdependencies between technologies, tasks or inputs). Design work is characterised 
by high levels of both organizational and technological complexity. Construction design teams are 
'temporary, multidisciplinary and network-based organizations' (den Otter and Emmitt, 2008, p122) 
and design involves a network of tasks, requiring contributions from many specialists and the 
involvement of a complicated 'web' of inter-organizational relationships (Pietroforte 1995; 1997; 
Nicolini et al. 2001). 
 
Interdependency between design tasks requires frequent and detailed interaction between 
contributors to ensure that components are compatible (Gray et al. 1994). The complexity inherent 
in construction design is highlighted in research by Austin et al. (1999) who report that the design 
of a typical building comprised between seven and ten iterative loops. Each of these iterative loops 
involved between five and 30 interrelated loops. The number of design tasks was around 350-400, 
and the number of information dependencies was over 2400. Austin et al. (2001) found similar 
complexity in the conceptual design of a single building element (a relatively simple modular 
window system).  
 
The assumption that design decisions are made exclusively by occupants of an abstract socio-
technical role, ‘the designer’ is problematic. In construction it is often suppliers and subcontractors 
that demonstrate innovation and independent decision-making in the design and manufacture of 
specialised building components (Gray and Flanagan 1989; Slaughter 1993). In the context of 
increased product complexity, specialist contractors are often responsible for the detailed design of 
specific building elements (Haviland 1996). This is acknowledged by Wright et al. (2003), who 
concede that many technology-based CHPtD solutions are driven by building systems 
manufacturers and not by principal design consultants. 
 
Implications for CHPtD research 
CHPtD research has attempted to superimpose a standard OHS risk management process on the 
activity of design, leading to the development of protocols for the identification of hazards, the 
assessment of risk, and selection of appropriate risk controls prior to specific ‘hold points’ in the 
development of a design (see, for example, a description of this process provided in Lingard and 
Rowlinson, 2005). The assumption underpinning standard OHS risk management activities is that 
hazards (defined as conditions that have the potential to cause harm) can all be clearly identified at 
the beginning of the linear process of risk management. Any hazards that are not identified at this 
step will be excluded from the subsequent analysis of OHS risk (i.e. an assessment of the likelihood 
that harm will eventuate and the consequence of that harm). Thus, OHS risk management processes 
lack the flexibility to cope with emergent hazards. 
 
Another difficulty with standard risk management methods is that they are based upon the 
assumption that a project can be decomposed into its constituent parts enabling risks inherent in 
each of those parts to be controlled. Although embodied in widely accepted methods for managing 
project scope (i.e., work breakdown structures and milestone plans), project time performance (i.e, 
project networks and project evaluation and review techniques) and project costs (i.e, cost 
breakdown structures and earned value analysis), Cooke-Davies et al. (2007) argue that 
decomposition models are not well suited to the analysis of complex, nonlinear, dynamic systems, 
like construction projects. Pavard and Dugdale (2006) suggest that complex systems have a limited 
functional decomposability. In the case of design work in construction it is difficult (if not 
impossible) to decompose system elements into design functions, professional contributions or 
logical 'steps' because they are in permanent interaction with one another and facets of the external 
environment. This interaction creates emergent properties that cannot be identified or anticipated 
even with a good understanding of individual component parts. 
 
A growing number of project management scholars call for the use of methods that are more 
holistic and qualitative in the analysis of project processes (see, for example, Williams 1999). In 
this context, a case can be made for CHPtD research to explore more sophisticated explanatory 
models of the way in which design decisions with the potential to influence construction workers’ 
OHS are made. Such models are important in order to develop CHPtD interventions that are based 
upon a closer connection between industry practice and theory.  
 
Actor-Network Theory 
Actor-network theory (ANT) is a useful approach through which to investigate the aetiology of 
design decisions with the potential to influence OHS in construction. ANT is an ontological 
framework for the investigation of socio-technical interactions. One of the key features of ANT is 
the notion of ‘symmetry’ in which neither a social nor a technical position is privileged. 
‘Transformation’ is understood to occur through dynamic network effects resulting from the 
formation and reconstitution of relations between human actors and non-human artefacts, a process 
termed ‘heterogeneous engineering’ (Law, 1992). ANT studies do not view events as attributable to 
an external social force impelling a group of actors to behave in a certain way. Rather, connections 
between human actors and non-human actants are understood to effect transformation. Latour 
(2005) states that ANT studies regard the social as something that needs to be explained, rather than 
a force that provides an explanation for events. ANT is also sometimes referred to as the ‘sociology 
of translation’ because it concerns itself with the way in which relations between human and non-
human entities induce transformation by triggering chains of unexpected but traceable change-
inducing events (Latour, 2005, p.106). ANT acknowledges that the connection between decisions, 
actions and outcomes is complex and uncertain. ANT studies have also been characterised by a 
reversal in causality in which technological artefacts are not regarded as passive objects, whose 
existence is merely enabled by human actors. In ANT thinking, it is possible for technologies to 
become active agents with the ability to shape and sometimes undermine decisions made by human 
actors.  
 
 
The primary focus of ANT is to examine the dynamic process of association, change and 
reconstitution between actors and actants in a network (Latour, 2005). Consequently, ANT lends 
itself to the analysis of decision-making and practices in construction projects in which project 
teams comprise heterogeneous, self-organizing coalitions of autonomous agents between whom 
associations vary over time (Fernandez-Solis, 2008). Further, ANT does not establish the 
boundaries of networks a priori and networks are therefore not restricted by project, organizational 
or industry boundaries (Latour, 2005). In this, ANT is well-suited to the analysis of the OHS 
implications of design decisions, as it is has been shown that OHS is influenced by factors 
originating outside the boundaries of a project (HSE, 2003).  
 
Previous ANT research in construction 
An ANT approach has been used to analyse a number of construction project phenomena (see, for 
example, Harty, 2008; Schweber and Harty, 2010; Sage et al., 2010, Tryggestad, 2009). In 
particular, ANT has been deployed is to expose the complex interactions between project 
stakeholders and material artefacts inherent in the design of buildings (see, for example, Ewenstein 
and Whyte, 2007). Tryggestad et al. (2010) used ANT to reveal how construction design work is a 
collective activity characterised by distributed knowledge production. The resulting process is 
reflexive, flexible and characterised by serendipitous ‘trade-offs.’ Harty (2010) also used ANT to 
describe the way in which the use of a new technology is ‘translated’ through unfolding relations 
between the technology itself and various human entities, including user groups. CHPtD can be 
regarded as a social technology, similar to ecologically sustainable construction, and we suggest 
that its adoption can be usefully analysed using ANT. 
 
ANT concepts 
Two key ANT concepts drawn upon in the present analysis are intermediaries and mediators. The 
former is defined by Latour (2005) as an entity that “transports meaning or force without 
transformation” (p.39). An intermediary is a passive component of an actor-network that does not 
transform action and is sometimes referred to as a “black box” because its outputs can be defined 
with knowledge of its inputs. Latour also comments that intermediaries can be regarded as a single 
entity even when they are made of many component parts because they are predictable, known and 
stable, although sometimes for a limited period only. In contrast, mediators are active entities within 
an actor-network. They “transform, translate, distort and modify the meaning of elements they are 
supposed to carry” (Latour, 2005, p.39) and, as such, the outputs of a mediator cannot be predicted 
from knowledge of its inputs. One of the fundamental purposes of ANT studies is to identify when 
and how actors act, i.e., when they are behaving as intermediaries and when they are behaving as 
mediators. Further, it is possible for an intermediary to become a mediator as Latour describes the 
properly functioning computer (a black-boxed intermediary) changing into a complex mediator 
when it breaks down and produces outputs that are no longer predictable.  
The research gap 
CHPtD researchers have not yet undertaken a robust analysis of the way in which dynamic 
associations (between multiple project participants and material artefacts) unfold to produce a level 
of OHS. This research sought to address this gap by adopting an ANT approach to the analysis of 
socio-material complexity inherent in the implementation of CHPtD. In particular the research 
explored the role of human actors and material artefacts in actor networks engaged in construction 
design. In particular, the research sought to identify the roles of intermediaries and mediators in 
these networks, as well as instances in which passive intermediaries became active moderators 
which ultimately shaped design and CHPtD outcomes. 
 
 
Research setting and methods 
 
The project setting (Case Context) 
The research adopted a case study approach, favoured for the rich causal data that it produces 
(Orum et al, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fellows and Liu, 1997; Yin, 1994). This was considered 
paramount to the research, due to the lack of deep theoretical understanding of the intricacy of 
designing for OHS in construction. Substantive evidence of the reasons why design decisions were 
made and how they influenced OHS outcomes on site were collected and ‘chains of evidence’ 
constructed within the context of the case. The case comprised four embedded units, each a 
particular building element of the project case. 
 
Data were collected at a food processing plant located in the outer suburbs of Melbourne, Australia. 
The plant had been partially destroyed by a fire in January 2010, resulting in closure and the loss of 
1,700 jobs in the local area. Originally the client decided that the plant would not be rebuilt.  It had 
been in operation since 1919 and, despite many upgrades and extensions, the plant was of an old 
design and the client organization had newer, more efficient sites in other locations. However, to 
prevent the loss of employment in the area, the State Government of Victoria offered substantial 
monetary assistance to the client to support re-construction and fast-tracked the planning process to 
facilitate this. As a consequence of this support, the client decided to re-build the plant and 
appointed a contractor under a ‘design and build’ contract to undertake the project. The client also 
engaged specialist designers for the water treatment plant and elements of the processing equipment 
to be installed in the facility. To combat the risk of losing business to competitors during the 
reconstruction period, the client set an ambitious date for the re-opening of the plant, compressing 
the design and construction work into a ten month period.  
 
 
The legislative context 
At the time of the data collection there was no statutory requirement under the Victorian OHS 
legislation for designers to eliminate or reduce OHS risk to construction personnel. Section 28 of 
the Victorian Occupational Health and Safety Act (2004) requires the designer of building or 
structure to be used as a workplace to ensure that it is designed to be safe and without risks to the 
health of persons using it as a workplace. WorkSafe Victoria, the regulatory agency, has published 
guidance material stating that the design of the construction and demolition phases of a building or 
structure’s lifecycle do not fall within the scope of Section 28 (WorkSafe Victoria, 2005). As a 
consequence, in the state of Victoria it has been common practice for design teams to assess and 
attempt to design out OHS risks relating to the operation stage of a facility but not consider the 
health and safety of construction workers in the same risk management process. 
 
Data collection 
Gorse and Emmitt (2007) identify the need to investigate social interaction and communication in 
'live' construction projects. In-keeping with this recommendation, the data collection approach 
adopted involved a number of different methods including: (i) direct observation of project team 
interactions; (ii) interviews with project actors; and (iii) inspection of artefacts, such as aspects of 
the physical worksite and project documentation. Gluch (2009) describes the observation of situated 
social interaction using an ethnographic approach as particularly useful because people are not 
always aware of the knowledge they bring to a situation and sometimes may not even have the 
vocabulary to talk about it. This may be particularly true in the case of CHPtD which is a relatively 
new concept in the Australian construction industry and about which most design professionals 
have received little instruction during their professional education and training. Also, the ability to 
observe and record activities as they occur is a valuable tool in the study of human activity in which 
there may be a difference between ideal and manifest behaviour. For example, Larsson (2007) 
reports that when asked to describe their behaviour, people tend to give an account closer to the 
ideal than the manifest. 
 
The principal features of interest for data collection were traceable associations between actors and 
actants, which resulted in the transformation of design with the potential to influence CHPtD. The 
researcher attended fortnightly design team meetings at the project site between 27th May 2010 and 
13th October 2010, and weekly meetings thereafter until 15th December 2010. Direct observation of 
project participants was followed by a series of interviews to explore the meaning that participants 
attributed to design decision-making. Proponents of ANT suggest researchers “follow the actors” 
(Callon 1991) and allow them to define the boundaries of the research. This approach was followed 
in the identification of actors for interview. In particular, the researcher identified a number of 
building elements for analysis, based on observations of design team meetings. For each element, 
the design and build contractor’s project manager was interviewed along with the design 
professions with contractual responsibility for the design of the specific element. From these 
interviews, other entitles whose physical properties, actions or interests shaped the design became 
apparent and these ‘leads’ were followed up with further interviews. This process continued until no 
new leads were identified in actors’ interviews. 
 
In total 18 project participants were interviewed, including some ‘external stakeholders.’ Interviews 
were conducted with, representatives of the ‘design and build’ contractor, the structural engineer, 
the hydraulic engineer, the project architects, the structural steel subcontractor, the plumbing 
subcontractor, the concrete subcontractor, the services installation contractor, the Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA), the local water authority, the Country Fire Authority (CFA), the 
specialist fire engineer, the building surveyor, the trade waste design consultant and the client. The 
interviews explored project stakeholders’ expectations, motivation and reasoning relevant to design 
decisions pertinent to four design aspects selected for analysis. These embedded units are presented 
as ‘vignettes’ below. The vignettes provide a description of the way in which decision-making was 
constituted through interactions between the various project stakeholders and non-human artefacts. 
The manner in which the interactions between human actors and non-human actants shaped CHPtD 
is revealed in each vignette. 
 
Design issues with relevance to construction workers’ OHS 
 
Design issue one – fire damaged columns 
As a result of the insurance company’s assessment of the fire damage, three columns and the roof 
structure of the evisceration building were extensively damaged and were to be replaced. However, 
the remainder of the building was deemed to be structurally sound. From the beginning of the 
project, tensions regarding the optimal structural support solution for the evisceration building were 
evident.  
 
From the outset, the construction contractor responsible for the building design and construction 
expressed a preference that the entire building be demolished and re-constructed. The project 
manager commented “…we tried early on to persuade the client to pretty much ball the whole area 
over…but anyway that was our brief.”  The client was driven by a concerns about being able to 
deliver on a production contract with a large customer (a leading supermarket chain) and preferred 
to retain as much of the building as possible, believing this to be the quickest re-construction 
option. At this point in the design it was assumed that the columns that had not been fire damaged 
were in good condition and the columns were behaving as passive intermediaries in the translation 
of the design.  
 
However, the behaviour of the columns altered dramatically when, during stripping back, extensive 
damage to the blockwork encasing the columns was revealed and it became apparent that a number 
of the columns were significantly affected by rust.  At this point the columns became active 
mediators in the actor-network. The condition of the columns themselves became a significant 
influence in the design of the structural support system. Again, the contractor suggested the 
columns be demolished, but the client’s instruction was to continue with the repair work. The 
contractor’s project manager accepted this instruction but continued to believe this to be the least 
efficient design solution, commenting with resignation that ‘so from that point we had to move on to 
the repair.’   
 
Having made the decision to retain as much of the original structure as possible, the design goal for 
the evisceration building was further changed when a decision was made to increase the facility’s 
production capacity. This decision was taken by the client who decided to reap the maximum 
benefit from the subsidy awarded by the State Government of Victoria. However, increasing the 
facility’s capacity changed the production plant and building services requirements for the 
evisceration building, significantly increasing the load requirements for the columns. Thus, the 
upgraded machinery and equipment, acted as a significant mediators, creating new challenges for 
the structural design consultant. The engineer advised the client that the new design requirements 
would require retained columns to be substantially repaired and strengthened, again suggesting that 
replacing the columns may be a more efficient solution. The engineer commented that “the client 
made the decision that it was more economical to retain the existing columns and strengthen them.”  
 
The column strengthening was to be achieved using a system of stiffening plates, in addition to 
removing and replacing those sections of the columns that could not be repaired. The strengthening 
involved the installation of a new column section behind the existing column. The length of the new 
sections varied depending upon the degree of dilapidation. Consequently, it was decided that pre-
fabrication was not an appropriate method. A constructability review (undertaken with the 
subcontractor who would perform the work) revealed that the main OHS risk inherent in the 
strengthening was the risk of working at height. To mitigate this risk it was decided that work 
would be undertaken using a mobile elevated work platform (a ‘cherrypicker’). This decision was 
documented in a work method statement. This paper output of the constructability review defined 
work practices for the column strengthening and, from that point, construction methods were not 
modified by actors involved in the column design or by further changes to the design itself.  
 
The requirement to install props to support the structure while the strengthening work was 
underway presented a problem for the use of a ‘cherrypicker’ and also impacted upon other 
subcontractors working within the building area. Further translation of the design took place as a 
result of interaction between the construction methods, i.e., use of the ‘cherrypicker,’ the structural 
engineer and column erection subcontractor. Following consultation with the subcontractor, the 
design was modified to remove the requirement for propping the columns during construction. The 
engineer developed a safe method by which this could be achieved. He stated “From our 
perspective, we are worried about the structural integrity of the building… so, for example, some of 
the stiffening elements would be need to be taken out so we would say [to the subcontractor] you 
need to put some elements in before you take some elements out.”  
 
Engaging the relevant actors in the constructability review for the column design was beneficial as 
it transformed the design process from one in which the OHS of construction workers may have 
been compromised, to one in which CHPtD was integrated. The subcontractor commented “on 
other jobs they just give you stuff and you end up having to deal with it.”   
 
However, there remained poor alignment of actors’ interests in relation to the evisceration building 
column design. Latour (1987) used the term ‘trial of strength’ to describe a lack of alignment which 
can alter the constitution of an actor-network as poorly aligned actors may cease to interact.  
 
The decision to retain as much of the existing structure as possible precluded the use of alternative 
designs which would arguably have been safer. For example, the pre-fabrication of columns would 
have dramatically reduced the need to work at height. Ironically, given the client’s concerns with 
construction time, the ‘design and build’ contractor commented that “….it took us longer to fix it 
than it would to build a new one”. 
 
Design issue two – waste discharge system 
In order to maximise the benefit derived from the government subsidy, the client opted to re-
construct the waste discharge system at the plant. The underground waste treatment system had not 
been badly damaged by the fire, however the existing system did not separate trade waste, human 
waste and stormwater and no longer met the requirements of current environmental legislation. The 
client’s decision to substantially increase the production capacity of the new plant necessitated a 
major upgrade of the waste discharge system and a specialist hydraulic engineer was engaged by 
the client to design the new system.  
 
The design of the waste discharge system evolved as decision-makers interacted with one another 
and with physical features of the system. From the outset, the local water authority was an 
important actor in the network, expressing concern that discharges from the plant would exceed 
capacity and flood the authority’s local water treatment infrastructure.  
 
The originally proposed design separated the various discharge streams such that trade waste, 
sewerage and stormwater would each be pumped via dedicated lines. Sewerage and trade waste 
were pumped to a dedicated pumping station belonging to the water authority but located on the 
client’s premises. However, the physical properties of the waste itself mediated the water 
authority’s concerns and ultimately shaped the design requirements for the waste discharge system. 
The water authority advised that to accommodate the waste flow rates associated with the increased 
production capacity of the new plant, the pumping station would also need to be upgraded at the 
client’s expense. This was deemed financially infeasible by the client and a new design solution was 
sought.  
 
The hydraulic engineer proposed some alternative design solutions to the water authority and 
preliminary approval was obtained so that site preparation work could commence. However, the 
detailed design of the waste discharge system was undecided. After considerable exchange of 
information and meetings between the hydraulic engineer and the water authority, a spreadsheet of 
design options was drawn up by the water authority. The spreadsheet provided the basis upon which 
the stakeholders were able to articulate their different interests and become actively involved in the 
negotiation to find an appropriate solution to the problem. Following multiple interactions via 
emails, telephone conversations and in face to face formal and informal meetings, a workshop was 
convened at which the actors’ representatives were able to argue their positions. At this workshop a 
design solution was finally agreed and accepted by all parties.  
 
The agreed design incorporated septic tanks with a two hour retention system. The hydraulic 
engineer described the role played by the workshop in enabling the convergence of stakeholders’ 
interests and stabilisation of the design as follows: “We were then able to thrash out a suitable 
concept.  After that meeting we really had the concept that is out there now….We walked away from 
a workshop session with one of those options refined, in-keeping with what everyone around the 
table thought was an agreeable solution.”   
 
The initial design of the septic tank utilised large concrete pipes which would be lowered into a pit 
using a crane. Workers would then enter the pit to seal the joints and ends of the pipes, presenting 
OHS risks associated with working inside a confined space. However, during the design it became 
apparent that prefabricated “off the shelf” fibre-glass septic tanks could also be utilised. The pre-
fabricated fibre-glass option was determined to be cost-effective and easier to install. Minor 
alterations required to make the pre-fabricated tanks fit for purpose could be performed at ground 
level prior to installation. However, the fibreglass tanks were not designed to take live loads so 
bollards were used to demarcate the perimeter of both the septic tanks and the holding tank to 
prevent damage or collapse by truck movement on the site. In the original design, the septic tank 
was located next to the existing pumping station, which was situated within 10 metres of an old 
filtration pond. While the original design sited the tank some distance from the existing filtration 
pond, the water authority required the new holding tanks to be located between the pumping station 
and the pond to reduce the number of turns in the pipes carrying waste material. This presented an 
OHS issue during construction as water constantly flowed into the excavation and had to be 
pumped out.    
 
The decision of the client to retain and utilise as much of the existing drainage structure as possible 
increased the complexity inherent in the design and construction of the waste discharge system, as 
the condition and location of the existing pipes became a major shaping factor. The design required 
that any new lines installed were to connect with the existing drainage pipes. However, very limited 
information about the existing drainage system was available to the design and construction team 
requiring extensive exploratory work. The ‘design and build’ contractor’s project manager 
commented: “In a perfect world, if we had time we would do a full video inspection and go through 
it with them and say this is going to be a problem or we cannot do it …[but] in this case we have 
just said that we would make do with what we have got, and roll on.”  In a number of instances the 
existing drainage system had to be exposed to determine suitability of reuse.  This resulted in 
plumbers having to dig through existing concrete and ‘work around’ other services located in the 
same area as the waste pipes. Uncertainty about the location, depth and nature of underground 
services increased the OHS risk to workers engaged in this work.  
 
Design issue three – services and equipment in the boning and packing building 
The original boning and packing building was completely destroyed in the fire and had to be re-
built as part of the new facility. The design of the ceiling space above the boning and packing 
building was shaped by an actor network that extended beyond those directly involved in the project 
itself to include food safety authorities, a large supermarket chain as well as specific elements of the 
building planning process.  
 
The ceiling space was designed to house plant and equipment necessary for production and an 
external regulator (The Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service) established some specific 
requirements in relation to the health and safety aspects of food processing and handling. For 
example, the boning and packing area was to be maintained at a temperature of between five and 
10º C during production. This required the installation of large refrigerator units measuring three by 
four metres in the roof space. Consequently, the layout of the roof space was based on the 
mechanical design and location of these units.  
 
Additionally, all the plant and equipment located in the boning and packing area would be serviced 
by utilities located in the roof space, requiring that all the services feeding the equipment, air, water, 
electricity, etc. would run through the roof space. Secondary steel was incorporated in the design to 
support the plant, equipment and services that were to be located in the roof space. The plant and 
equipment itself was therefore an important mediator, actively shaping the design of the boning and 
packing building.  
 
However, a great deal of uncertainty surrounded the specifications for plant and equipment for 
installation in the boning and packing room, which was crucial to the ceiling space design. When 
construction commenced, the client’s plant and equipment requirements for the boning and packing 
building were not known. At this time, the ‘design and build’ contractor’s project manager advised 
the client that, to ensure the adequacy of the supporting structure to meet the plant’s operational 
needs, equipment requirements were needed urgently. He commented “We told the client that if they 
couldn’t lock their equipment positions down within six weeks, we weren’t confident that we could 
provide them with adequate steel work.”   
 
As the design work progressed, the plant and equipment continued to act as an important mediator 
in the design but uncertainty surrounding the specification of this plant and equipment remained. 
Indeed, the design requirements were changed through interactions with additional actors who 
joined the actor network. For example, a major supermarket chain changed its requirements for food 
packaging, resulting in changes to plant and equipment to be installed mid-way through the design. 
This altered requirements for the location of the supporting structure and services. To cope with the 
uncertainty, the mechanical design team decided to incorporate an over-engineered steel support 
grid for the roof space.  Ongoing uncertainty concerning plant and equipment to be installed in 
boning and packing room played an active significant role in the shaping the design of the support 
grid.  
 
The symbiotic nature of design was also evident in the case of the services and equipment in the 
boning and packing room as selection of plant/equipment was simultaneously influenced by and 
influential in the design of the building itself. The choice of plant and resulting roof space 
requirements for services was influenced by pre-determined height limits arising from the expedited 
planning approval process that had occurred at the outset of the project. According to the ‘design 
and build’ contractor’s project manager “[space restrictions] were a product of the fact that when 
the discussions were going to push the building ahead it was agreed with the Minister of Planning, 
the local council, the client and ourselves, that as the planning drawings were pushed through in 
about a week, that a very quick set of drawings were done and they determined the height of the 
building….For us to go back and change [the nominated heights] would have put the project at 
risk.”  The immutability of the building’s dimensions substantially restricted designers’ options. 
 
The interaction between the roof space design, plant size, location and the mechanical services 
layout had ‘knock on’ effects on construction workers’ OHS. For example, the location of 
walkways in the roof space was determined by the placement of structural elements and the position 
of plant and services. As a result, the walkways had to be constructed over and under steel beams 
increasing the length of walkway to be laid and the number of joins required. Thus, workers 
installing the walkways had to manoeuvre components in congested areas, increasing the risk of 
manual handling-related injuries and the duration of exposure to working at height was increased.  
 
The contractor noted that the concurrent design and construction of the boning and packing building 
had presented safety challenges: “Normally the preliminary design process is to uncover issues such 
as how high should your building be.  We almost skipped prelim. design to a certain degree. So that 
has caused us issues. So for the roof height, rather than have a flat walkway they will dip under a 
beam. All those sorts of things that if you could have avoided it then you would have.”   
 
Design issue four – fire rating the boning and packing building 
The fluidity of the plant and equipment specification also presented challenges in the design of the 
boning and packing building for the purposes of satisfying fire rating requirements. It was the 
client’s preference that a sprinkler system not be installed into the building. However, after 
construction work had commenced, a review by a registered building surveyor revealed that, if a 
sprinkler system was not installed, to satisfy the Building Code of Australia (BCA) requirements, it 
was necessary to ‘design in’ a fire-rated wall to reduce the size of the building compartments.  
 
The necessity to include a fire wall was made once the primary structure was already erected.  As 
the ‘design and build’ contractor’s project manager commented: “We were literally putting up a 
building when we found that our areas were over what we thought they were.  Whereas normally 
you would be in a conceptual design you would see it and stop and evaluate it, whereas having been 
committed to a building out there, we had to make the decision to put a block work wall in.”   
 
The original plan was to erect the fire-rated wall using a ‘tilt-up’ panel method of construction.  
However, it was understood that penetrations would need to be made in the wall to accommodate 
plant and services. As there remained uncertainty about the plant and equipment that was to be 
installed in the boning and packing building, the dimensions and location of these penetrations was 
not known. At this stage the plant and equipment was behaving as a mediator in the network 
actively shaping design decisions and material choices. Consequently, it was decided to construct 
the wall using block work to allow for penetrations to be more easily made when the building’s 
equipment and services design was finalised.  
 
The Country Fire Authority (CFA) also emerged as an important member of the actor-network as it 
became apparent that the building design deviated from the specification standards contained in the 
BCA, necessitating approval of these design aspects by the CFA. Notwithstanding the designers’ 
decision to construct the building using fire retardant panels, the CFA advised that they would not 
support the original building design because the design did not provide full perimeter access for 
their fire appliances.  
 
At the time of constructing the block work wall, the number, size and location of penetrations were 
not known. The project manager commented: “The equipment contractors were direct to [the 
client] and they were hard to pin down.  So we always knew that product had to come through…so 
this issue has see-sawed back and forth with the issues that we have had with the openings.”   
 
When the plant and equipment requirements were eventually forthcoming, the behaviour of the 
plant and equipment in the actor network changed from that of an active mediator to that of a 
passive intermediary. The properties and character of the plant and equipment became temporarily 
predictable and stable. However, the passive behaviour of the plant and equipment in the actor 
network was to be short-lived due to ongoing contention about the appropriateness of the fire rating 
of the boning and packing building. Once the plant and equipment specification was issues it was 
discovered that the required penetrations were considerably larger than the 600mm² allowed for in 
the block work wall. Not only would this necessitate re-work, but it would also compromise the fire 
integrity of the wall. Work commenced to enlarge the penetrations, presenting specific OHS risks to 
workers involved in the demolition work. Then, once the plant was installed, the installation 
contractor advised that the openings in the block work wall could actually have been 40% smaller in 
size.  
 
To maintain the integrity of the firewall, the penetrations were then in-filled to the recalculated 
sizing. However, this reconstruction had to take place after the fixed plant was already in place and 
so workers had restricted access to the work area. The construction of the penetrations required that 
the block work be cut and the flashed with stainless steel to adhere to the food safety regulator’s 
requirements.  Whilst the openings were not high in the wall, scaffolding was required to provide 
access.  
 
The openings in the firewall remained a subject of contention with the fire authorities and the actors 
in the network became engaged in a trial of strength concerning the suitability of the firewall. The 
CFA maintained that the block work wall could no longer act as a firewall when it included 
penetrations. In the CFA’s opinion the building was an oversize single building that required a 
sprinkler system to comply with the BCA.  
 
An assessment was commissioned from a fire engineer who advised that ‘fire tunnels’ would be 
required either side of the wall to stop the spread of fire, smoke and heat. The size (or length) of the 
tunnels was to be proportional to the size of the openings - the larger the opening, the longer the 
tunnel.  However, at this point the plant and equipment began to behave as a mediator once more, 
actively shaping decisions about the best way to achieve the required fire rating performance for the 
building. Limited space was available for the construction of fire tunnels as fixed plant had already 
been installed either side of the fire wall. The original design for the tunnel required a 2.5 metre 
length, for which there was insufficient space.  A reduction in the size of the openings permitted a 
reduction in tunnel length to 1.8 metres. The construction of the fire tunnel commenced without 
CFA approval, in order not to fall behind the project schedule. In the event, the CFA did not 
approve this design, insisting on the installation of a full sprinkler system to the boning and packing 
building. In order to obtain approval for the building design, the client had to agree to retro-fit the 
building with a sprinkler system after the start-up of production.  
 
It was clear that alignment of actors’ interests was not achieved in the translation of the boning and 
packing building design and there remained disagreement concerning whether the fire wall with fire 
tunnels should be deemed to satisfy the requirements of the BCA. The project manager expressed 
his frustration as follows: “It was quite difficult to explain to the CFA what the site does and how it 
works and therefore what the risks are and what the issues are…They don’t really understand the 
operations of the plant in that they see a factory, they think warehouse, they think mounds and 
mounds of cardboard.  That’s the perception that I get.  In a food processing environment it’s 
mostly stainless steel and mostly non-combustible.  It’s like there are whole sections of the plant 
that are at sub zero, or zero…. If we had a lot of time on our hands, if we had had another 12 
months then we might have said fine we will take our line and you take yours, because we disagree 
we go to building appeals.  Obviously that would have been a way to resolve that, but we couldn’t 
afford [the delays].”  
 
The late inclusion of a sprinkler system into the design meant that the installation presented specific 
OHS challenges as the workers undertaking the installation needed to negotiate existing plant and 
services located in the ceiling, a confined space. Another area of OHS concern was access to the 
underside of the ceiling to install the sprinkler heads.  Fixed plant and equipment had been installed 
in the building, which could not be moved to provide space for access equipment. Further, the 
production plant was operational when the sprinkler system was installed, providing only a short 
window of opportunity to carry out the work.  
 
Discussion 
 
CHPtD in actor-networks 
The four vignettes reveal how design decisions ‘unfold’ within actor-networks and influence 
construction workers’ OHS in construction projects. The quality of CHPtD outcomes in each 
vignette was influenced by the dynamic interaction between a range of relevant project 
stakeholders, as well as the material artefacts that constituted participants’ understanding of the 
viability or appropriateness of available design options for the project. Although the identity and 
configuration of actors differed, all of the vignettes revealed that OHS outcomes for construction 
workers were co-produced by a combination of social and material factors. Figure 1 provides a 
simplified representation of the network of actors and their interactions for the design of the 
wastewater system.  
 
The vignettes reveal considerable tension between actors’ interests and material agency. From the 
outset of the project, the design of the facility was shaped by complex interactions between multiple 
actors and the material condition of the damaged building. The insurance company had inspected 
the site the day after the fire and made an assessment of the extent of the damage which determined 
the size of the claim to be paid to the client organization. Consequently the project budget was 
determined by this assessment and the decision was made to retain as much of the original structure 
as was possible. This decision presented a number of design challenges in the project which had 
relevance for CHPtD. For example, the decision to retain the original structure of the evisceration 
building resulted in the need to strengthen the columns supporting the structure, presenting 
challenges for the manoeuvrability of equipment to gain access to height. The decision to retain as 
much of the original concrete pipe in the underground waste discharge system significantly shaped 
decisions concerning the design of the system, influencing CHPtD. The insurance company’s 
original assessment report, the project budget and original client brief became critical artefacts in 
the transformation, through design and construction, of the physical condition of the facility, 
defining the viability of design alternatives and the selection of the construction technologies.  
 
The vignettes also reveal that the client’s goals for the project changed as the design evolved and 
new information was introduced by different actors. For example, uncertainty concerning the space 
requirements for equipment and services to be installed in the boning and packing room impeded 
detailed consideration of CHPtD in the design stage. The complex web of factors influencing the 
OHS performance of the design are perhaps best illustrated by the decision of a major supermarket 
chain to change packaging of meat products, which determined the design of the plant and services 
to be installed in a roof space already constrained by height restrictions associated with the original 
building planning approval. A similar level of uncertainty surrounded decisions made concerning 
the fire rating of the boning and packing room. The end product of a lengthy trial of strength 
between the suppliers of specialist plant and equipment, the project engineer, the CFA, a specialist 
fire engineer and the ‘design and build’ contractor was a decision to retrofit a sprinkler system into 
the building after its completion. This decision illustrates the way in which OHS hazards can 
emerge from the complex interaction and articulation of actors’ interests and technological 
artefacts, even after the commissioning and handover of a facility. 
 
These findings are consistent with the argument of Tryggestad et al. (2010) who suggest that design 
decisions are the output of collective action. They suggest that design goals should not be viewed as 
invariant inputs that are established at the commencement of a project and remain unchanged. 
Rather, design is a flexible process of engaging in ‘trade-offs’ to achieve workable solutions to 
emergent problems. This contingent view of design raises questions about the practical 
implementation of CHPtD because it is inconsistent with the standard approach to OHS risk 
management which is not sufficiently flexible to cope with adaptive decision-making and emergent 
hazards.  
 
The vignettes also reveal that it is problematic to allocate responsibility for OHS in construction 
design in a simplistic way to an individual design professional, e.g. ‘the architect’ or ‘the engineer.’ 
Law (1992) cautions against ‘punctualizing’ actor-networks by treating parts of the network as if 
they were a ‘black box.’ Black boxing parts of an actor network renders invisible the complex 
socio-technical components that make up these networks. The vignettes demonstrate the importance 
of ‘unpacking’ design decision-making associated with specific building components to understand 
the heterogeneity of players and interests involved in decisions that influence construction workers’ 
OHS. Our empirical results challenge the assumption that building design can be decomposed into 
specialist packages for which a specific design consultant is held singularly responsible. The 
punctualization of actor networks gives the appearance that the design of a building component is 
produced by a single point actor and implies that CHPtD responsibility rests with the “seemingly 
simple author of that action.” (Law 1992, p.385). The vignettes reveal that a more nuanced view of 
construction design decision-making is warranted and the allocation of professional responsibility 
for CHPtD must be informed by a robust understanding of the complex socio-material interactions 
shaping design decision-making in any given project situation. 
  
The interests and influence of external stakeholders 
One particularly striking feature of all four vignettes is the significant role played by actors external 
to the project in shaping design decisions that subsequently influenced construction workers’ 
experience of OHS. External stakeholders included the insurance company, the State Government 
of Victoria, the CFA, AQUIS, the local water authority and even the supermarket chain that 
purchases the client’s product. Harty (2008) suggests that construction projects are ‘relatively 
unbounded’ contexts in which actor-networks are continually changing. He argues that an ANT 
approach is ideally suited to the analysis of phenomena in relatively unbounded contexts because it 
does not define, a priori, the boundaries of any particular actor-network. Thus, the analysis of an 
actor-network should not be restricted to members of a particular social group, such as a profession, 
organization or project. Our results strongly suggest that any consideration of CHPtD within 
construction projects should not be contained within the boundary of a single organization or 
project. Indeed, greater recognition of the role played by parties external to projects in shaping 
CHPtD outcomes is needed. 
 
Implications for CHPtD policy and practice 
The research findings have important implications for the implementation of CHPtD policy and 
practice. First, the importance of the role and influence of external stakeholders suggests that the 
implementation of CHPtD processes within a single design organization and/or construction project 
is likely to be of limited effectiveness. Harty (2008) argues that innovation that aims to change the 
way that organizations function needs to be implemented “across [the] inter-organizational 
landscape” in which these organizations operate (p.1030). This is very apparent in the multi-
stakeholder construction environment.  
 
The breadth of the actor-networks which generate design decisions with implications for 
construction workers’ OHS also suggest that an industry-level approach to the development of 
CHPtD policy and practice may be needed. Given the socio-material complexity surrounding 
construction design, it is problematic and arguably inappropriate to ascribe responsibility for 
CHPtD to an abstract socio-technical role, i.e., ‘the designer.’ Although OHS legislation often 
defines the role of the designer broadly, design is still understood to be the product of an individual 
duty-holder’s activity. Definitions of ‘the designer’ embodied in OHS legislation do not adequately 
reflect the fact that construction design is a distributed, heterogeneous activity characterised by 
collective knowledge production. As such it is difficult to identify the degree of responsibility 
attributable to individual actors.  
 
It is also possible that many of the protocols, procedures and tools available to support the 
implementation of CHPtD are currently unable to cope with the dynamic and contingent nature of 
design work in the construction context. For example, advocates of BIM, assume that detailed 
building information models can be constructed at an early design stage and that these models can 
be used to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the OHS risks presented by a particular design. 
However, this proposed use of BIM technology assumes that highly detailed and stable information 
about building components is available at a particular assessment point. Although intuitively 
appealing, there are very real practical difficulties associated with this assumption. Our research 
(and that of Tryggestad et al. 2010), suggests that design is a political and reflexive process of 
collective negotiation. In this context, uncertainty is prevalent and design goals are subject to 
change. It is imperative that any research investigating the development of CHPtD management 
processes or tools take the reflexive nature of design work into consideration and address the issue 
of how their processes and/or tools ‘fit’ within design work. 
 
Implications for CHPtD research 
Koskela and Vrijhoef (2001) identify a significant gap between theory and industry practice in 
construction management research. Thus far in CHPtD research, there has been very little 
theoretical treatment of the problem. We contend that this has hindered the implementation of the 
CHPtD concept as there is a lack of understanding of how CHPtD can be integrated into design in 
practice. At present, we suggest that current linear CHPtD models do not adequately reflect the 
complexity or ‘messiness’ of design decision-making in practice.  
 
Cicmil et al. (2006) call for a shift from 'theories of practice' to 'theory in practice,' in which project 
management research is grounded in the lived experience of project participants. In CHPtD 
research, few researchers have attempted to observe the unfolding of design decisions in live 
projects and/or ‘unpack’ stakeholder roles, interactions and interests that have the potential to 
influence construction workers’ OHS. However, it is important that CHPtD research is informed by 
an understanding of the ‘messy’ nature of design work and the practical challenges inherent in 
integrating OHS considerations into decision-making. Sage et al. (2010) argue that if decision 
processes are to be modified and improved within construction projects, it is essential that power 
relations and interactions between people and technologies are better understood. We suggest that 
ANT is a potentially useful ‘lens’ through which the OHS outcomes of negotiations between 
stakeholders can be better understood.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Limitations and future research 
The research adopted an embedded case design in which design aspects were traced within a single 
construction project. The construction project at which data were collected was not a new 
‘greenfield’ project but involved the restoration and re-construction of an existing facility. Further, 
it is reasonable to expect that the way in which design decisions are made will vary depending upon 
the project delivery mechanism selected by a client. This research cannot be generalised to the 
construction industry as a whole. However, the research demonstrates that socio-material 
complexity is a feature of design in at least one type of construction project and that this complexity 
has the potential to influence the integration of CHPtD into project processses. Further research, 
using the same methodology to trace design decision-making in construction projects of different 
types and procured under different arrangements is being conducted. This research will provide an 
analysis of the role played by project type and procurement mechanism on the practical 
implementation of CHPtD. 
 
Notwithstanding its limitations, the research highlights the complexity inherent in integrating 
CHPtD into construction design. An ANT approach was used to reveal how the interaction between 
project participants and material artefacts, including the structure itself, shaped design decisions 
which had significant OHS implications for construction workers. The influential role of 
stakeholders external to the project was particularly striking. Through this analysis, a number of key 
challenges associated with the practical implementation of the CHPtD were noted. Not least among 
these is the apparent incompatibility between prevailing assumptions of CHPtD tools and resources 
and the contingencies of reflexive design practice. Previous CHPtD research has focused upon 
demonstrating a link between design and the incidence of work-related injury to construction 
workers. However, now that this link has been convincingly demonstrated, to advance the 
implementation of the CHPtD concept, we argue that theoretically grounded propositions about the 
relationship between design practice and construction workers’ OHS need to be developed and 
tested. With this recommendation in mind, we hope that this contribution provides a helpful 
beginning to the development of ‘theory in practice’ relating to CHPtD. 
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Figure 1: A representation of decision making in relation to the waste discharge system from an actor-network perspective showing actors and 
artefacts that influenced decisions. 
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